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By Ronald Benton Brown and Joseph M. Grohman
n the 1980s real estate brokers dis-
covered that they risked liability for
breaching fiduciary duties they did not
know they had if they failed to
disclose property conditions to buyers,
even though disclosure could violate
their duty to sellers. Conversely, they
might have breached their duties to
sellers if they disclosed to prospective
buyers unpleasant facts that stigma-
tized the property. Brokers reacted by
lobbying for legislative protections. As
a result, many states adopted statutes
allowing brokers to enter into new rela-
tionships, shifting the burden of dis-
closing property conditions to sellers
and shielding brokers and sellers who
fail to disclose facts that psychological-
ly stigmatize property. These statutory
solutions, however, have failed to elim-
inate material risks to brokers and may
have subjected them to new risks.
Brokerage Relationships
Real estate brokers originally acted
as independent agents of sellers trying
to find buyers. Then brokers learned
they could earn more by working
together and sharing commissions
on many sales instead of keeping
whole commissions on fewer sales.
Gradually, they developed real estate
exchanges to share lists of properties
for sale. Under these arrangements,
less scrupulous brokers could ap-
proach the seller directly and bypass
the seller's original broker. Open list-
ings contributed to this practice.
Nevertheless, the opportunity for
profit from cooperation was too great
to ignore and multiple listing services
developed. These services compiled
and maintained the member brokers'
lists of properties for sale. Only
member brokers had access to the
"multiple lists." As a condition of
membership, a broker agreed that,
when trying to sell properties listed
by another member broker, the sell-
ing broker acted as an agent of the
listing broker and, hence, as a sub-
agent of the seller. Member brokers
also agreed that, if another member
produced the buyer, the listing broker
would share the commission accord-
ing to a prearranged formula-
typically, 50-50. Under this system,
brokers who entered into listing con-
tracts with sellers were classified as
"listing brokers," and brokers who
worked with and produced buyers
were classified as "selling brokers."
Buyers generally thought of the
brokers who helped them locate
property as "their" brokers. But, as a
subagent of the seller, a selling broker
had a fiduciary duty only to the seller.
A selling broker had no duty to the
buyer other than the duty not to act
in a tortious manner that owes one
member of the public to another. That
notion was very difficult for buyers to
understand or remember, especially
when they actively worked with sell-
ing brokers to find the right property.
Residential buyers were particularly
likely to develop a close relationship
with the selling brokers.
Good brokers are adept at getting
to know people and their preferences.
To avoid wasting time or frustrating
buyers by showing them properties
they cannot afford, brokers prequalify
prospective buyers and obtain an
accurate picture of their financial
ability. Good brokers know their terri-
tories and can quickly narrow the
search once they know a buyer's
likes, needs and price range.
Naturally, the process of dis-
cussing sensitive personal matters
makes prospective buyers feel close to
brokers, and that closeness leads buy-
ers to believe they can and should rely
on them. Moreover, as sales-people,
brokers recognize that the first step is
to establish a rapport with buyers so
they will rely on the brokers' recom-
mendations. A 1983 Federal Trade
Commission survey showed that 72%
of buyers thought that selling brokers
who helped them find property were
representing them rather than the
sellers. Federal Trade Commission, 1
The Residential Real Estate Brokerage
Industry: A Staff Report by the Los
Angeles Regional Office 69 (1983)
(FTC Survey).
The fact that listing brokers also
worked with buyers added to the
confusion. In fact, listing brokers pre-
ferred to find the buyers themselves
so they would not share the commis-
sions with other brokers. Listing
brokers, too, interviewed prospects
to learn about them, especially their
finances, and to match them with the
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right properties. This process also left
many buyers with the perception that
the listing brokers were "their" bro-
kers. The FTC Survey showed that
31% of buyers in a one broker transac-
tion thought the broker represented
them. Id.
Regardless of buyers' expectations,
by law, listing and selling brokers had
a fiduciary duty only to the sellers.
That duty included not revealing
sellers' secrets to buyers and telling
the sellers anything that would lead to
the quickest sale at the highest price.
Listing and selling brokers had a duty
to push a closing that was in the sell-
er's best interest, even if that was not
in the buyer's best interest. Many
buyers later felt that "their" brokers
had betrayed them. They were angry,
and some sued.
Changing Roles
Much to the brokers' surprise,
some courts did not follow the
traditional agency analysis. They
recognized that a common law agency
relationship is created when the prin-
cipal manifests an intent that the
agent act for him or her, the agent
accepts responsibility and the principal
has the right to control the venture.
After analyzing the selling brokers'
conduct, these courts concluded that
some selling brokers had entered into
agency relationships with buyers con-
current with their agency relationships
with sellers. See Joseph M. Grohman, A
Reassessment of the Selling Real Estate
Broker's Agency Relationship with the
Purchaser, 61 St. John's L. Rev. 560
(1987). Dual agency was, and is,
perilous because it requires identical
loyalties to parties with different, often
opposite, wishes and needs. The dual
agent must not violate the duty of loy-
alty to one party by fulfilling the same
duty to the other. Brokers who inad-
vertently became dual agents had little
chance of avoiding a breach of their
duties. In particular, a dual agent must
disclose the existence of the dual
agency to both principals.
Some brokers thought these devel-
opments offered new marketing
opportunities. They became "buyers'
brokers." As such, they offered to
act solely as agents of the buyers to
ensure their undivided loyalty. When
brokers originally structured these
arrangements, buyers were to pay
buyers' brokers on an hourly basis.
Many brokers quickly learned, how-
ever, that few buyers were willing to
pay an hourly rate when it appeared
they could get the same services for
free from other brokers who would
receive a commission from the seller.
As a result, many buyers' brokers
changed their approach to an agree-
ment for a share in the commission
or a finder's fee.
Agency law does not require that
the agent be paid by the principal.
Many multiple listing services, how-
ever, would not grant membership or
multiple list access to buyers' brokers.
Many listing brokers refused to share
commissions with buyers' brokers
because they had not performed as
sellers' subagents. Thus, the potential
conflict of interest still posed a prob-
lem. The buyer's broker, whom the
buyer does not pay, has injected a
new factor into sales negotiations. The
buyer's best interest may not be the
broker's primary concern, and getting
the seller and listing broker to share
the commission with someone other
than seller's subagent may result in a
higher price.
New Statntory Relationships
With the active support of their
trade organization, the National Asso-
ciation of Realtors, brokers succeeded
in lobbying 41 states to pass statutes
that allow a variety of relationships.
Brokers can still enter into a tradition-
al agency relationship with a buyer or
seller. A selling broker can still be a
subagent of the seller, and it is still
possible to be a buyers' agent. Now,
however, in these states it is also pos-
sible to be a dual agent or a nonagent.
For a more detailed analysis of the
statutes, see generally Ronald Benton
Brown, Joseph M. Grohman and
Manuel R. Valcarcel, Real Estate
Brokerage: Recent Changes in Relation-
ships and a Proposed Cure, 29 Creighton
L. Rev. 25 (1995).
Typically under these new
statutes, to enter into these relation-
ships, brokers must follow prescribed
disclosure procedures. Some statutes
created what might be called a "dis-
closed dual agent." See, e.g., Or. Rev.
Stat. § 696.815; Ind. Code Ann. §§ 25-
34.1-10-7 and 25-34.1-10-12 (permit-
ting "limited agents"). Under this
approach, the broker simultaneously
owes a fiduciary duty to the buyer
and seller, but the duty to each is lim-
ited by the duty to the other. When
a lawyer simultaneously represents
two parties and a dispute develops,
the lawyer is required to withdraw
from both representations. No
statute appears to require a similar
withdrawal by dual agent brokers.
Nevertheless, a broker who continues
to represent both or chooses one
side after a conflict arises seems to
be inviting a lawsuit.
In contrast, the nonagent repre-
sents neither party. Under the terms
of some statutes, the nonagent is a
"deal agent" who represents the
deal rather than the parties. The
nonagent may also be described as
a "facilitator," a "transactional bro-
ker" or an "independent contractor."
See, e.g., Colo. Rev. Stat. § 12-61-802;
Fla. Stat. ch. 475.01(k). A broker cre-
ates this statutory relationship by
following the proper disclosure pro-
cedures. Nonagents have obligations
prescribed by statutes, perhaps sup-
plemented by regulations. Nonagent
brokers are subject to policing by
their state licensing authorities to
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make sure they have documented
their disclosures.
One additional problem is that
in many states a licensed real estate
salesperson can operate only through
a broker. With the automatic offer of
subagency for the seller that was com-
mon in multiple listing services, the
knowledge and duties of each licensee
are imputed to the broker and all
licensees associated with the broker.
For "in-house" transactions in which
both the listing agent and the buyer's
agent are associated with the same
broker, this imputation creates
dual agency relationships through-
out the brokerage. This problem was
addressed in Washington by creating
the concept of "split" or "assigned"
agency under which each licensee
represents only the party with whom
the licensee is working; only the
broker is a dual agent (to which the
parties must consent). R.C.W. ch.
18.86. This 1996 law also codified
disclosure and confidentiality duties.
Despite these developments,
potential problems remain. Disclo-
sures may not be properly made.
Even if they are, a broker may not
be able to prove proper disclosure.
In that case, the broker may be in an
unexpected fiduciary relationship.
Also, these statutes generally do not
abrogate the common law of agency.
Thus, brokers who originally enter
into statutory nonagency relationships
may find that their conduct has placed
them in a fiduciary relationship.
Moreover, the whole statutory
scheme is based on a disclosure to
the prospective buyer. As evidenced
by the FTC survey, buyers did not
understand that a selling agent was
a subagent of the seller. The brokers
might not have explained that to the
buyers. Even if they had, it is quite
possible that the explanation would
have been ineffective. A buyer would
need to understand the concepts of
agency and subagency and retain that
understanding throughout the entire
transaction. All the while, the broker's
conduct as a good salesperson might
have led the buyer to expect that the
broker was on the buyer's side.
Today's statutes have replaced
one simple relationship, which was
not understood, with four equally
complicated choices. Under the old
agency/subagency system, only
buyers were likely to be confused
about brokers' roles. Under today's
statutes, a broker's relationship with
a seller might be any one of several
choices. Thus, these statutes may have
spread the potential for confusion.
The statutory solution has been to
provide consumers a disclosure state-
ment. But a disclosure form is no way
to explain agency law. In addition,
handing prospective buyers a disclo-
sure statement invites questions.
Unless they are lawyers, brokers
may not have the training--or be
licensed-to make that explanation.
Nevertheless, brokers, who are
competing for business, cannot
realistically be expected to refuse an
explanation. Moreover, buyers and
sellers cannot compare the services
different brokers offer unless they
understand the ramifications of the
different relationships the brokers
are willing to enter.
In short, these statutes create more
problems than they were intended
to solve. Apparently recognizing
this, Kansas repealed its multiple-
relationship statute and returned to
agency/subagency status pending
further study. See 1996 Kan. Sess. Laws
Ch. 212 (S.B. 710), abolishing Kan. Stat.
Ann. §§ 58-30.101-58-30.112, effective
July 1, 1997. A different approach is
clearly needed to deal with these prob-
lems. Until a new solution is adopted,
it is necessary to consider some addi-
tional problems in disclosure and
nondisclosure obligations that these
new relationships cause.
Disclosure of
Property Conditions
Under the traditional agency/
subagency relationship, the broker
could not disclose to the buyer any
information that was detrimental to
the seller. If a court found that a selling
broker had become a dual agent, the
fiduciary duty to the buyer required
the selling broker to disclose prop-
erty conditions that might affect the
decision to buy. One case held that a
selling broker also had a duty to
diligently inspect the property and
disclose to prospective buyers any
material facts that the inspection
would have revealed. Easton v. Strass-
burger, 199 Cal. Rptr. 383, 387-89 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1984).
Brokers responded by lobbying for
statutes requiring sellers to disclose
these defects to prospective buyers,
thus shifting the disclosure burden to
sellers and removing brokers from this
predicament. This approach had pop-
ular appeal because it provided new
consumer protection, and case law in
many jurisdictions already required
sellers to disclose latent defects. Cali-
fornia passed the first disclosure
statute in 1988, and 27 states had such
statutes at the latest count.
Complying with the disclosure
requirements is not easy for many
sellers. It requires collecting informa-
tion, recalling events and, in some
states, properly completing a compli-
cated form. The seller is likely to turn
to the broker with questions about
what and how to disclose. When
assisting sellers, listing brokers
must be very careful not to offer
legal advice or inadvertently enter
into an unintended agency relation-
ship. Moreover, a buyer injured by
nondisclosure might find that the only
readily available defendant is the bro-
ker who helped the seller prepare the
disclosure statement. Creative legal
minds are certain to come up with a
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viable theory to hold the broker liable
in at least some circumstances.
Nondisclosure of
Psychological Stigma
Another disclosure problem is
information that might psychological-
ly stigmatize or taint the property,
making it difficult to sell. Should or
could a listing broker disclose these
facts to unaware potential buyers?
Traditionally, the answer would have
depended on the relationship that the
broker had with the buyers.
Brokers who are agents of sellers
cannot reveal these facts without
breaching their fiduciary duty to
sellers. Buyers' brokers owe their sole
fiduciary duty to the buyers, so
disclose they must. Dual agents
generally must reveal every material
fact to buyers. If they reveal what
sellers consider to be confidences,
however, they may be liable to sellers.
Non-agents' disclosure duties depend
on statutes that generally require the
nonagent to reveal every material fact
about the property to buyers, even if
the broker is the listing broker. The
critical question may be whether the
fact concerns the property or not; dis-
closure statutes generally do not
address this issue.
The problem first caught the
public's attention when the stigma
involved sellers or prior occu-
pants infected with the HIV virus.
Although public health officials
have assured the public that the next
occupant is not at any risk, many
buyers would not knowingly buy
such a property. If the knowledge
is widespread, it could affect the
market value of the property. Non-
disclosure of HIV infection, however,
is apparently protected by the 1988
amendments to the Fair Housing
Act. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f). Further-
more, HUD officials have informally
expressed their view that unsolicited
disclosure of a seller's HIV infection
would violate the Fair Housing Act.
Uncertainty over their obligations
made brokers uncomfortable. Many
states reacted by providing specific
statutory protection for nondisclosure
of sellers' or prior occupants' HIV sta-
tus. Thirty states now have nondisclo-
sure shield laws, and some have gone
beyond the HIV issue. For example,
Wisconsin protects nondisclosure of
an act or occurrence that "had no
effect on the physical condition of the
property or any physical condition"
and specifically includes proximity to
a nursing home or community-based
residential facility. Wisc. Stat. Ann.
§ 452.23. North Carolina provides that
"it shall not be deemed a material fact
that the real property was occupied
previously by a person who died or
had a serious illness." N.C. Gen. Stat.
§ 39-50. In contrast, Kentucky only
protects against the nondisclosure of
a prior occupant's HIV infection. Ky.
Rev. Stat. Ann. § 207.250.
Two well publicized cases led
some states to enact broader nondis-
closure protections. In one case, the
buyer learned that his new home had
been the site of multiple murders.
Reed v. King, 193 Cal. Rptr. 130 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1983). In another, the buyer,
who was not a "local," was surprised
to find that his new house had a repu-
tation as being haunted. Stambovsky v.
Ackley, 572 N.Y.S.2d 672 (1991). Some
statutes now shield brokers and
sellers who do not disclose such
facts as a death or violent crime on
the premises or gang activity in the
neighborhood. Some of these shield
statutes have general catchall cate-
gories that might even protect a seller
or broker who fails to disclose the
suspected presence of a ghost.
For a more detailed discussion
of these state statutes, see Ronald Ben-
ton Brown and Thomas H. Thurlow,
Buyers Beware: Statutes Shield Real
Estate Brokers and Sellers Vho Do Not
Disclose That Properties Are Psychologi-
cally Tainted, 49 Okla. L. Rev. 625
(1997). Some of these statutes, howev-
er, have procedures by which buyers
may inquire about stigmatizing facts.
If the potential buyer asks the right
question the right way, then a re-
sponse is required. How would buy-
ers find out what to ask and how to
ask it? Buyers would logically expect
this information from "their" brokers.
In states with affirmative disclo-
sure laws, the receipt of the sellers'
mandatory property condition disclo-
sure forms will likely lull buyers into
believing they know every material
fact. To many buyers, however, these
shielded facts may also seem materi-
al, as evidenced by the very existence
of the shield laws. Arguably, based
on the buyers' reasonable expecta-
tions, "their" brokers have a duty to
warn them that shield laws exist and
that buyers cannot expect to learn this
information from the normal disclo-
sures. It is clearly in the best interest
of brokers, who are paid commissions
out of the sales proceeds, not to kill
the deal by raising the issue of a
psychological stigma. That fact cre-
ates the appearance that the brokers
have joined the sellers' side, even if
they claim to be dual agents or neu-
tral nonagents.
Note that brokers who are nona-
gents should not owe the buyer or
seller any duty other than what is
specified by the statutes. For example,
nonagent brokers should have no
duty to explain shield laws. After all,
the buyers received disclosure forms
explaining the brokers' nonagency
status. It is unlikely, however, that
the buyers fully understood those
disclosures and more unlikely that
the buyers remembered it. As a result,
shield statutes create the potential for
buyers and sellers to feel betrayed by
"their" brokers. This potential may
lead to buyers' claims that the bro-
kers, by their conduct, changed their
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relationship from nonagent to agent
with a fiduciary duty to buyers that
would be breached by an inadequate
warning of a psychological stigma.
Some courts might find that an
agent of the seller, subagent of the
seller or dual agent has breached a
fiduciary duty to the seller by even
pointing out the existence of the shield
law. Some courts might find that the
shield statute creates an implied duty
on the broker's part, even the buyers'
broker, not to raise the issue of psy-
chological stigma. Thus, the broker is
still faced with a dilemma about what
to say and potential liability for mak-
ing the wrong choice. Buyers who
learn of stigmatizing facts after the
closing will feel wronged by "their"
brokers. Many will look for a remedy.
Some may succeed.
Conclusion
In simpler times, the listing broker
was the agent of the seller and the
selling broker was the subagent. Both
owed their sole duty of loyalty to the
seller. The rules were simple: do not
commit fraud; tell the seller every-
thing; protect the seller; and tell the
buyer nothing except what is needed
to make the deal and close it. Those
simple times are over. Agency, sub-
agency, dual agency, split agency,
disclosed dual agency, nonagency,
deal broker, facilitator, independent
contractor, relationship disclosures,
property condition disclosures and
psychological stigma nondisclosures
now complicate life for real estate bro-
kers. In shouldering this new world of
burdens, brokers must now choose
what relationship to have with their
clients, satisfy relationship disclosure
requirements, not commit the unau-
thorized practice of law in explaining
the relationship and behave consis-
tently with the chosen relationship.
These burdens include making the
appropriate disclosures about the
property and nondisclosures of
psychological stigmas. Under the cur-
rent generation of statutes, real estate
brokerage is not simple.
Ronald Benton Brown and Joseph
M. Grohman are professors at Nova
Southeastern University Shepard
Broad Law Center in Fort Lauderdale,
Florida.
Aunt Edna understood his need to "see the world."
Cousin Harry just thought he was a bum.
Who should pay to find him?
Every case, every situation, every heir is different.
For some heir location cases, our flat fee, paid by the estate, is the
best solution. (hie wifth Edna.) For others, the right option is a contingency
fee, negotiated with the lost heirs. (Hariy9 cear preference.) Blake and Blake
is proud to provide you with your choice of fee arrangements. With success
guaranteed or there's no fee at all. Call us toll free at 1-800-525-7722.
For heir location to meet the needs of your case.
(Even if it bivolvs a bun who'i seen the ,,orld.)
F Blake & Blake Genealogists
Searc4tng.brtbe; ./hte; ,ita guaranteed results.
Business Office: 1515 South Federal Highway e Suite 105 * Boca Raton, Florida 33432
Corporate Office: 50 Braintree Hill Office Park * PO. Box 9128 * Braintree, Massachusetts 02184
Toll Free 800 525-7722 * Toll Free Fax 800 525-5672 * eMail blakeinfo@flinetcom
Visit our web site at http://www.blakeandblake.com
May/June 1997
